

Towards A Pluralist Theory of Truthmaking

Abstract

This paper introduces a new approach to the theory of truthmaking. According to this approach, there are multiple forms of truthmaking. Here, I characterize and motivate a specific version of this approach, which I call a ‘Pluralist Theory of Truthmaking.’ It is suggested that truthmaking is a plural, variegated phenomenon wherein different kinds of truths, e.g., positive truths, negative truths, counterfactual truths, etc., are made true in different ways. While the paper only aims to lay the groundwork for a Pluralist Theory of Truthmaking, I show how the theory can be applied to positive and negative truths. The upshot of this application is that truthmaking pluralism allows us to provide negative truths with ‘non-suspicious’ truthmakers. Finally, it is argued that Truthmaker Maximalists would do well to endorse truthmaking pluralism, as it offers a new strategy for upholding Maximalism while diminishing controversial ontological commitments.

§1. Introduction

Truthmaker theory begins with the compelling thought that truth is, in some way or another, dependent on, grounded in, or derivative of being. For truthmaker theorists, this thought is typically articulated in the truthmaker principle:

(TM): Necessarily, for all propositions p , if p is true, then there exists something that makes p true.¹

An entity that *makes* a proposition true is called a ‘truthmaker’ for that proposition. Since TM quantifies over all true propositions, it entails ‘Truthmaker Maximalism,’ the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker. While truthmaker theorists disagree about what it is for a proposition to be made true, they generally agree that truthmaking is a form of non-causal dependence that may relate entities from different ontological categories (namely, truth-bearers to entities like individuals, states of affairs, or tropes). There is also substantial agreement that truthmakers *necessitate* their truths, hence “Truthmaker Necessitarianism”:

¹ Armstrong (1997, 2004), Lowe (2009), Cameron (2008a), Alston (1996), Mulligan (2007), and Schaffer (2010a), and (apparently) Rasmussen (2013) endorse this principle.

(Truthmaker Necessitarianism): If an entity x is a truthmaker for the proposition p , then it is necessary that if x exists, then p is true.²

It is widely recognized, however, that there is more to truthmaking than mere necessitation. Thus various other constraints on the truthmaking relation beyond necessitation have been proposed, e.g., that truths be about their truthmakers, that it is part of the essence of the proposition to be true when its truthmaker exists, or that truthmakers relevantly entail their truths.³ Let us call a commitment to TM (hence Maximalism), Truthmaker Necessitarianism, and some further relevance constraint on truthmaking a commitment to ‘Orthodox Truthmaking Theory’ (OTT hereafter).⁴

There are a number of well-known problems for OTT. One problem is that there are a variety of truths for which there are no obvious truthmakers. Call this the ‘problem of missing truthmakers.’ Obviously, if some truths have no truthmakers, then Maximalism is false, which entails that OTT is false. So the defender of OTT needs to provide every truth with a truthmaker. While true positive existentials and true contingent positive predications are reasonably held to depend on what exists, it is not evident what entities make true negative existentials, general truths, truths of mere possibility, necessary truths, subjunctive conditionals, and, if one is a presentist, past truths. It is highly plausible that some such propositions are true, so OTT is committed to the existence of truthmakers for all of these kinds of true propositions.

² Armstrong (1997; 2004), Smith (1999), Mulligan, et al. (1984), Fox (1987), Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005), Lowe (2009), Molnar (2000), Cameron (2008a), and Merricks (2007) accept Necessitarianism. Though, Merricks is no truthmaker theorist; he only thinks truthmaker theorists ought to accept Necessitarianism. Not everyone agrees that truthmaking is or involves necessitation, e.g., Cameron (2005), Schaffer (2010a; 2008), Parsons (1999), Heil (2000; 2006), and Briggs (2012).

³ See Merricks (2007), Smith (1999), Lowe (2009), and Read (2000), respectively, for these suggestions.

⁴ Goff’s (2010) uses “OTT” to denote what he calls “Orthodox Truthmaker Theory,” which he characterizes as a commitment to only Truthmaker Maximalism and Necessitarianism.

The problem of missing truthmakers gives rise to another problem: the putative solutions offered by truthmaker theorists typically involve the postulation of new and unfamiliar entities that strike many as problematic, ad hoc, or ‘suspicious.’⁵ Call this the ‘problem of suspicious truthmakers.’ Truthmaker theorists have postulated negative facts, absences, totality facts, irreducibly past directed properties, irreducibly counterfactual properties, and others to provide truthmakers for negative truth, past truths, and counterfactual truths, respectively.⁶ The reason these entities strike many as suspicious or dubious additions to our ontology is that they seem to be invented for the sole purpose of providing truthmakers for recalcitrant truths. Presumably, providing truthmakers for such truths should not be as easy as postulating an entity or property for everything we can say about a thing. Some constraints, it seems, are required on what entities can be postulated as truthmakers.

There are two popular responses to these problems in the literature. The first is to abandon TM in favor of the weaker ‘truth supervenes on being’ principle; there is no change in what is true without a change in being. John Bigelow formulates this idea, saying “If p is true, then either at least one entity exists which would not exist, were p false, or at least one entity does not exist which would exist, were p false” (1988: 133). David Lewis (2001) endorses this principle as well, but formulates it in terms of possible worlds. The second response is to restrict TM to only certain classes of truths. The idea here is that only some truths, but not others, substantially depend on being by having truthmakers. Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005), for example, thinks that only “an important class of synthetic true propositions, including inessential predications” have truthmakers (2005: 17). Smith (1999;

⁵ Merricks (2007: 35-38) and Sider (2003: 41) should be consulted for this sort of criticism.

⁶ Armstrong (2004), Bigelow (1996), Cameron (2008a), Schaffer (2010b), Russell (1985), Martin (1996), and Kusko (2006) all offer putative truthmakers for the recalcitrant truths that have been criticized for being suspicious or otherwise problematic.

2005) restricts the scope of truthmaking to contingent truths (see Mulligan, et al. (1984) as well). Others restrict TM to positive (contingent) truth, denying that negative truths have truthmakers because they are true for ‘lack of false-makers,’ e.g., <there are no unicorns> is true because the corresponding positive truth <there are unicorns> has no truthmaker, namely a unicorn, an entity which would render <there are no unicorns> false if it existed.⁷

I do not intend to defend either OTT or a weakened ‘truth supervenes on being’ principle in this paper. Nor will I argue that some truths should be absolved of needing truthmakers. Instead, I am going to sketch a new approach to the theory of truthmaking, one that I call ‘truthmaking pluralism.’⁸ The aim of the paper is to lay a foundation for a ‘Pluralist Theory of Truthmaking’ (PTT henceforth). According to PTT, different kinds of truths (e.g., positive, negative, counterfactual, modal) are made true in different ways. The intended upshot of PTT is that it offers a strategy for upholding Maximalism while diminishing controversial ontological commitments. I do not claim to have vindicated Maximalism in this programmatic paper. Nevertheless, truthmaking pluralism does open new and potentially fruitful means by which truthmaker theorists might pursue the theory. The plan for the paper is as follows. In §2 the general idea of truthmaking pluralism is presented and then a specific version of truthmaking pluralism—PTT—is outlined. Then in §3, two different kinds of truthmaking are distinguished, one for positive truths and another for negative truths. I attempt to show how the pluralist approach to truthmaking applied to

⁷ Lewis (1999) and (2001), Bigelow (1988), Mulligan et al. (1984: 315), Simons (2005), Smith (1999: 285), and Saenz (2013) also deny that negative truths have truthmakers. I’ll follow standard procedure and let <*p*> abbreviate ‘the proposition that *p*.’

⁸ While familiar in the literature on truth, pluralist strategies have not been explored with respect to truthmaking, as far as I know. Goff (2010), Tallant (2009a and 2009b), and Pendelbury (2010) are the only ones who explicitly entertain the idea of considering truthmaking on a kind-by-kind basis. A number of authors have explored diversity/plurality in the nature of ontological dependence and grounding. See, for example, Wilson (2014), Bennett (2011), Koslicki (2012), and my (2014).

negative truths yields ‘non-suspicious’ truthmakers for those truths. Finally, §4 motivates PTT and discusses some advantages PTT has over OTT and Non-Maximalism.

§2. Truthmaking Pluralism

§2.1 An Initial Characterization

The guiding idea of truthmaking pluralism is that there is more than one form of truthmaking or that there are different ways in which propositions can be made true. What distinguishes truthmaking pluralism from standard approaches to truthmaking is that it rejects an assumption made by most parties in the debate over truthmakers. It is the assumption that there is exactly one truthmaking relation and that it is a non-plural, non-determinable, and non-multiple-realizable relation that holds between each truth (that needs a truthmaker) and its truthmaker. Call this thesis, ‘truthmaking monism.’⁹ To my knowledge, all defenders of OTT are truthmaking monists as evidenced by their attempts to set down a single “principle of truthmaking” for all truths, i.e., a principle providing necessary and conditions under which an entity is a truthmaker for a proposition.¹⁰ Truthmaking pluralism is committed to there being more than one truthmaking relation.¹¹ Note that one could think that there are distinct truthmaking relations for domains of propositions D_1 and D_2 while

⁹ Even Non-Maximalists are typically truthmaking monists. Non-Maximalists who simply restrict TM to certain truths often hold that there is exactly one truthmaking relation but that only some truths stand in that relation to entities in the world. Moreover, those altogether skeptical of truthmaking usually assume that *if* there were a truthmaking relation, it would be a single, non-plural relation.

¹⁰ See Rami (2009) for discussion of the different principles of truthmaking.

¹¹ It appears that there are some philosophers who accept truthmaking pluralism but who would deny that each different form of truthmaking involves commitment to a unique truthmaking relation. Melia (2005), Schnieder (2006), and Horsby (2005) hold that there can be ‘truthmaking without truthmakers.’ While these philosophers do not deny that positive existential truths are made true by having truthmakers, they think that inessential predictive truths can be made true without postulating truthmakers such as tropes or states of affairs. If there really can be truthmaking without truthmakers, it would seem that these philosophers are committed to a (Non-Maximalist) version of truthmaking pluralism. To accommodate this view, a more neutral definition of truthmaking pluralism is that it is the view that truthmaking can take more than one *form*. For the record, I am skeptical that a proposition can be made true without there being anything to make it true.

maintaining that truths of domain D_3 have no truthmakers. Hence, a commitment to truthmaking pluralism is not necessarily a commitment to Maximalism.

The commitment to multiple truthmaking relations can be spelled out in a few different ways. We may begin by distinguishing strong from moderate truthmaking pluralism.¹² *Strong* truthmaking pluralism says that there is more than one truthmaking relation and denies that the various truthmaking relations are unified in any substantial way. This view also has the consequence that there is no general truthmaking relation that holds between all truths and their truthmakers. For the strong truthmaking pluralist, truthmaking would be disjunctive; it would be a relation defined by the disjunction of the principles of truthmaking $TM_1 \vee TM_2 \vee TM_3 \vee \dots \vee TM_n$ and reducible to the disjunction of the truthmaking relations $T_{R1}, \vee T_{R2}, \vee \dots, \vee T_{Rn}$. According to *moderate* truthmaking pluralism, there is more than one truthmaking relation, but these various truthmaking relations are unified in a substantial way. Moderate truthmaking pluralism is consistent with there being one truthmaking relation that is instantiated in every instance of truthmaking. With the basic idea of truthmaking pluralism in place, we can go on to formulate a specific version of the view.

§2.2 PTT Characterized

As a version of truthmaking pluralism, PTT says that there is more than one form of truthmaking. PTT's pluralism is a *domain-based* pluralism insofar as different forms of truthmaking are applicable only to particular domains of propositions. As I will develop it, PTT is a version of moderate truthmaking pluralism. There is one truthmaking relation T_R

¹² This distinction tracks the distinction between strong and moderate alethic pluralism drawn in the literature on truth pluralism. Thanks to an anonymous referee and Aaron Cotnoir for encouraging me to make this distinction with respect to truthmaking pluralism.

that is exemplified by all truths across domains. However, T_R is exemplified by truths of a particular domain D in virtue of a dependence relation R that holds between the truths of D and their truthmakers. More rigorously:

(PTT): For each different domain of propositions D_1, \dots, D_n apt for truthmaking, there is a different relation R_1, \dots, R_n that serves as the truthmaking relation T_R for the truths in D_1, \dots, D_n . Relations R_1, \dots, R_n are characterized or defined by the principles of truthmaking TM_1, \dots, TM_n , respectively.

A few important features of the theory should be kept in mind. As I am using the terms, ‘truthmaking pluralism’ refers to the general view that there are multiple truthmaking relations. One can be a truthmaking pluralist without adhering to PTT. I am developing PTT as a way for truthmaker theorists to preserve Maximalism vis-à-vis truthmaking pluralism. Strictly speaking, PTT does not entail Maximalism. It simply offers a way to *pursue* Maximalism by identifying different forms of truthmaking for different classes of truths on a case-by-case basis.¹³ To the extent that PTT takes truthmaking to have different manifestations in different domains, it is analogous to *alethic* pluralism. Alethic pluralism denies that truth itself is uniform in all its instances and maintains that truth is manifested differently in different domains of discourse (logic, physical sciences, ethics, jurisprudence, etc.).¹⁴ But unlike alethic pluralism, PTT is not a theory of truth, i.e., it is not a theory about what it is for a proposition *to be true*; it provides no definition or analysis of *being true*. PTT

¹³ It would be more accurate to describe PTT as being committed to “Methodological Maximalism,” i.e., the view that there should be a presumption in favor of TM; we should think that all truths have truthmakers until we have reason to think that some truths do not have truthmakers. Below, in section §4, I will discuss why Maximalists have a reason to endorse PTT. Jamin Asay should be given credit for coining the term ‘Methodological Maximalism.’ See Asay (*dissertation*: 48).

¹⁴ Alethic pluralism has been developed in a number of ways. See, e.g., Wright (1992), Lynch (2009), Edwards (2013), Kölbel (2008), Pedersen (2010), and Beall (2013) among others. Pedersen and Wright (2013b) canvass the various formulations of alethic pluralism. Sher (1999 and 2013) and Barnard and Horgan (2013) think that there are varieties or correspondence.

does not entail alethic pluralism though the latter entails some version of the former.¹⁵ As we will see below, PTT distinguishes domains in a different way from alethic pluralism. Finally, PTT is not committed to a particular view about what kinds of entities serve as truthmakers (e.g., states of affairs or tropes). Because it is fundamentally concerned with the nature of truthmaking, PTT is consistent with a variety of views on the nature of truthmakers.

Lynch (2009), an alethic pluralist, says that truth is one and many. As (moderate) truthmaking pluralists, we may appropriate Lynch's phrase and say that truthmaking is both one and many: one to the extent that there is a single truthmaking relation and many insofar as different relations can serve as the truthmaking relation for different domains of propositions. The nature of T_R , the connection between T_R and the various dependence relations in virtue of which T_R is exemplified, and the way in which domains are distinguished will be discussed in the sub-sections below devoted to unity and plurality in truthmaking, respectively.

§2.21 Unity

This sub-section will address two questions about unity in truthmaking: (1) What is the one truthmaking relation T_R that holds for all instances of truthmaking? (2) How are the

¹⁵ None of this is to say that PTT does not commit us to some views about truth. Indeed, it seems to commit us to thinking of truth as a relational property. And insofar as it seeks to provide every truth with a truthmaker, PTT appears to entail a kind of correspondence theory of truth, perhaps a variant of correspondence pluralism. All I want to do here is to distinguish the aim of a theory of truth and the aim of a theory of truthmaking. The aim of the former is to say what truth is, while the aim of the latter is to account for the dependence of truth on reality. Merricks (2007: 15) also distinguishes a theory of truth from a theory of truthmaking in this way. Armstrong (2004: 17) offers a theory truth in terms of having a truthmaker but recognizes that the theory cannot be regarded as a definition of truth since 'true' shows up on the right-hand side of the bi-conditional. Thanks to two anonymous referees for raising this question about the relation between truth theory and truthmaking theory.

various relations R_1, \dots, R_n that serve as truthmaking relations for their respective domains related to T_R .¹⁶

According to PTT, the truthmaking relation T_R is best understood in terms of the role it plays or function it serves in our metaphysical theorizing.¹⁷ This role can be characterized by a set of ‘core principles.’ The following principles are likely to be included in this set.¹⁸

- (a) Truthmaking is the relation of *being true in virtue of*.
- (b) Truthmaking connects representation (i.e., truth-bearers) to reality.
- (c) Truthmaking entails ontological priority: truthmaking grounds what is less fundamental (true propositions) in what is more fundamental (what exists).
- (d) Truthmaking is not a purely modal relation (as necessitation or supervenience are).
- (e) Truthmaking is an explanatory relation, i.e., an entity that stands in the truthmaking relation to a proposition explains the truths of that proposition.
- (f) Truthmaking is a relation of non-causal ontological dependence.

These principles characterize a relation that has a certain function in our metaphysics, viz. being the relation we use to account for a particular and important connection between truth and reality. Because these principles characterize T_R by defining a certain function, they provide a way to understand what it is for a relation to ‘play the truthmaking role’ for some domain of propositions. When a relation R_i satisfies (a)-(f) for a certain domain of propositions D_i , then R_i plays the truthmaking role for the truths in D_i . As such, T_R is a second-order, functional relation.

As a form of moderate truthmaking pluralism, PTT has it that T_R is instantiated in each instance of truthmaking. However, being a second-order relation, T_R is in every case

¹⁶ I thank an anonymous referee for their comments on this section. This section has also benefitted from Pedersen and Wright’s (2013b) helpful overview of the various forms of alethic pluralism.

¹⁷ This approach to truthmaking pluralism bears obvious structural similarities to Lynch’s (2001; 2009) functional theory of truth. According to Lynch, different first-order properties realize the functional second-order property *truth* in different domains of discourse.

¹⁸ These core principles are analogous to the truisms or platitudes of truth that some alethic pluralists (Lynch (2009) and Wright (1992) offer as a definition of truth. See Pedersen and Wright (2013b: 91) for discussion of the alethic pluralist’s core principles.

instantiated only *in virtue of* a certain (first-order) dependence relation R_i that holds between the truths of a domain D_i and their truthmakers. Two questions arise here. First, if relations R_1, \dots, R_n realize T_R , are R_1, \dots, R_n really truthmaking relations or is T_R the only truthmaking relation? In a strict sense, there is only one truthmaking relation, T_R . R_1, \dots, R_n are not intrinsically truthmaking relations because they do not play the truthmaking role in all of their instances. But in a less strict sense, R_1, \dots, R_n are all truthmaking relations insofar as they realize T_R . They are *derivatively* truthmaking relations because they play the truthmaking role for some domain of propositions. It is in this less strict sense that PTT affirms that there is more than one truthmaking relation. Second, what is this ‘in virtue of’ relation that holds between T_R and R_i ? Since we are treating T_R functionally, it stands to reason that this relation is one of *realization*. And because different dependence relations function as the truthmaking relation in different domains, T_R is *multiply* realizable. As I understand it, realization is a dependence relation that holds between attributes or attribute instances (where ‘attributes’ denotes properties and relations). What distinguishes realization from other dependence relations is that the realizers play some functional role characteristic of that which they realize. As a dependence relation, realization is asymmetrical and irreflexive. Hence, if R_i realizes T_R , then T_R does not realize R_i , nor does T_R realize itself.¹⁹

§2.22 Plurality

Truthmaking is unified to the extent that there is a single (albeit second-order functional) relation that is instantiated in every instance of truthmaking. On the other hand,

¹⁹ Treating T_R as a multiply realizable relation is just one way in which truthmaking pluralism can be modeled. The truthmaking relation T_R could be understood as a disjunctive relation $T_{R1}, \vee T_{R2}, \vee, \dots, \vee T_{Rn}$. The disjuncts would be unified insofar as they satisfy a certain generic characterization of truthmaking (e.g., the core principles (a)-(f) below). An analogous view with respect to truth—“alethic disjunctivism”—is found in Pedersen and Wright (2013b: 92) and Pedersen (2010). Alternatively, T_R could be understood as a determinable relation whose determinates are the various truthmaking relations R_1, \dots, R_n . This construal would be analogous to Edwards’ (2013) “determination pluralism” about truth.

truthmaking is plural insofar as it is a relation that is multiply realized by various first-order dependence relations. For different domains of propositions, different dependence relations play the truthmaking role. A dependence relation plays the truthmaking role if it satisfies the core principles (a)-(f) for a domain. A complete version of PTT will include (i) an account of the different domains of propositions, (ii) the various relations that function as the truthmaking relations for those domains, and (iii) the respective principles of truthmaking for each domain. While it is not possible to offer a completed version of PTT here, the list of relations that play the truthmaking role might include, but are not be limited to, determination, (certain kinds of) supervenience, composition, identity-dependence, essential-dependence, and grounding. Two concrete examples of truthmaking pluralism will be presented in the next section. I will offer two principles of truthmaking (one for positive truths and another for negative truths) and suggest that a determination relation plays the truthmaking role of positive truths and an asymmetrical supervenience relation plays the truthmaking role for negative truths.

It is important to note that while it is a necessary condition for playing the truthmaking role that a relation satisfy the core principles (a)-(f), it is not sufficient. PTT is a domain-based truthmaking pluralism, which entails that a relation R_i realizes T_R only relative to a domain of propositions D_i . Hence, even if R_i satisfies (a)-(f), R_i will not play the truthmaking role for any arbitrary domain D_i if R_i does not satisfy the core principles *with respect to* D_i . I offer no general criteria for determining when a relation plays the truthmaking role with respect to a certain domain. This is something that can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. This will require inquiry into the nature of the propositions belonging to a particular domain in order to determine the kind of dependence relation that is fit to relate those truths to certain parts of reality that ground them. The next section offers an example

of how reflection on the nature of certain propositions can point us to the kind of relation that serves as the truthmaking relation for those truths.

PTT is a domain-based pluralism. According to PTT, the domains for which there are unique principles of truthmaking more-or-less track the intuitive distinctions we draw between different *kinds* of propositions: positives (including existential, general existential, singular, predicative), negatives (including existential, general existential, singular, predicative), universal generalizations, counterfactuals, etc. and their necessary counterparts. It should be no surprise that PTT distinguishes domains in terms of logical form and modal status, since these divisions are widely accepted in the literature. Moreover, looking for plurality in truthmaking along these lines offers the possibility of providing an account of how truths for which there are no obvious truthmakers nonetheless depend on being. Dividing domains like this is not merely pragmatically advantageous; these divisions reflect real differences in the natures of these propositions, differences that help explain why it is hard to identify truthmakers for certain truths.

There is insufficient space for a full defense of distinguishing domains in this way. Fortunately, PTT does not require this in order to make progress. Some truths are, for example, paradigmatically positive and others paradigmatically negative, e.g., <there are electrons> is positive and there is no obviously negative proposition that is logically equivalent to it. Likewise <there are no unicorns> is negative and there is no obviously positive proposition that is logically equivalent to it. This seems to be the case with respect to the other domains of propositions. A few straightforward paradigmatic examples from each domain are all we need to start formulating principles of truthmaking for each domain. No doubt there will be fringe cases that are difficult to classify. But these are exceptions whose classification can be debated; they need not be decided ahead of time before pursuing

PTT. PTT does not, it should be noted, imply that the principles of truthmaking developed for different domains are immune to counterexample. Its methodology is simply more fluid: there is a reflective equilibrium between the formulation of the various principles of truthmaking and the differentiation of domains. In light of this, it may turn out that other factors, such as the *subject matter* of a proposition, contribute to distinguishing domains.²⁰ For example, we might think that moral truths are made true in a different way than other truths.²¹ Obviously, this would complicate matters since logical form, modal status, and subject matter, not being exclusive distinctions, cut across each other. This is not something that can be sorted out in a programmatic essay like this one, but, again, this need not be decided prior to our inquiry into the different forms of truthmaking.

§3. Truthmaking for Positive and Negative Truths

The aim of this section is to offer a case study of truthmaking pluralism. Specifically, the aim is to show how thinking of truthmaking as a multiply realizable relation can provide a way to uphold Maximalism with respect to negative truths without incurring commitment to the kinds of contentious truthmakers typically posited by truthmaker theorists.

Much has been written about how contingent positive (existential, singular, predicative, etc.) truths depend on their truthmakers, so this discussion will be brief. There is wide spread agreement that a proposition such as <Spot exists> is made true by the

²⁰ Alethic pluralists distinguish the domains for which truth is manifested by the subject matter of the propositions in each domain, e.g., material objects, mathematics, jurisprudence, ethics, etc. The reason PTT does not use subject matter as the primary criterion for distinguishing domains is that there are truths for which truthmaking is straightforward and truths for which truthmaking is not straightforward that seem to have the same subject matter, e.g., <Cabrera hits a home run> and <if Cabrera had not hit a home run, then the Tigers would not have won> both have the same subject matter, namely Cabrera and his home run. Whereas an account of how and on what the former proposition depends for its truth is forthcoming, it is not at all clear how and on what the latter depends for its truth.

²¹ Jamin Asay's (2012) "projectionist" truthmaking provides a distinct form of (non-realist) truthmaking appropriate for moral truth. If this form of truthmaking were taken on board by PTT, then the relation Asay describes would realize T_R for the domain of moral truths.

existence of the dog Spot. Spot, just by existing, makes <Spot exists> true. In fact, it is impossible for Spot to exist and for <Spot exists> to be false; hence, Spot's existence *necessitates* the truth of <Spot exists>. Moreover, <Spot exists> is (in some specific sense) *about* Spot's existence.²² On the basis of these two factors, we can formulate this plausible principle of truthmaking:

(TMP) For any entity x and contingent positive truth p , x is a truthmaker for p iff x is one of the things (i) that p is about and (ii) that necessitates that p is true.²³

The central feature of truthmaking for contingent positive truths is they are true in virtue of entities that they are about and which necessitate them. This conception of truthmaking looks to be describing a kind of metaphysical determination relation between an entity and a true proposition: the truth of the proposition is 'fixed' by the truthmaker in the sense that it *brings about or is responsible for* the truth of the proposition. This determination relation plays the truthmaking role, i.e., realizes T_R , for the domain of contingent positive propositions. The relation seems to satisfy (a)-(f): the form of determination characterized by TMP is explanatory, not purely modal, it relates what is more fundamental to what is less fundamental, and it is a form of non-causal ontological dependence. Importantly, the relation satisfies the core principle with respect to the domain. Positive truths represent that something is the case (e.g., that something exists, that something has a certain property, etc.). Since the existence of their truthmakers constitutes things being as these truths say that it is, the existence of their truthmakers would appear to *determine* their truth.

²² There is no universal agreement about how to understand the relevant notion of aboutness here. I assume that some such notion is well suited to serve as the relevance constraint on this form of truthmaking so that not any entity that necessitates a positive truth qualifies as its truthmaker.

²³ This is essentially the principle that Merricks (2007) urges truthmaker theorists to adopt. TMP may also apply to necessary positive truths, but since that is contentious, I'll simply restrict its domain to contingent positive truths. Moreover, I assume that entities from any ontological category can be the value of ' x ' in TMP. Hence, the principle allows positive predicative truths such as <the dog is brown> and positive relational truths such as <Detroit is north of Louisville> to be made true by states of affairs or tropes.

When we turn to negative truths, both conditions in TMP run us into difficulties. With respect to (i), it is not obvious what existing entity a negative truth such as <there are no unicorns> is about. With respect to (ii), it is quite hard to see what existing entity necessitates the truth of <there are no unicorns>. Providing negative existentials with necessitating truthmakers leads some theorists to postulate negative facts (Russell 1985), totality facts (Armstrong 2004), absences (Martin 1996 and Kusko 2006), and hold contentious views on the nature about the world (Cameron 2008 and Schaffer 2010b) to satisfy TM with respect to negative existential truths. It seems that if we want to provide negatives with necessitating truthmakers we will have to embrace the existence of one of these or some other equally contentious entities. In what follows, we will see how treating truthmaking as a multiply realizable relation can allow us to provide negative truths with truthmakers while diminishing the contentiousness of those truthmakers.

Formulating a full account of truthmaking for negative truths is not possible in this limited space. However, the essential features of such an account can be presented.²⁴ Unlike positive truths, negative truths state that something is *not*; negative existentials, for example, represent the *non-existence* of something. What makes it difficult to see how negative truths could be necessitated by anything (at least by anything we ordinarily recognize) is that the *existence* of some entity would have to guarantee that something else does *not* exist (namely, that whose existence is denied by the proposition). Given the nature of negative truths, a conception of truthmaking on which they are necessitated entities they are about, looks to be inappropriate.²⁵

²⁴ See my (2015) for a developed version of the following account of truthmaking for negatives.

²⁵ Some hold that necessitation is constitutive of truthmaking and hence hold that if negative truths are not necessitated by anything, then they do not have truthmakers. See Merricks (2007), Lewis (1999), and Melia (2005). However, I'm not convinced by the arguments for thinking that *all* truths with truthmakers have

Despite this, it does not follow that negative truths ‘float free’ of being or that they are not dependent on what exists beyond them. Indeed, there is a specific way in which a negative truths depend for their truth on being. Instead of being determined to be true by some particular entity (à la TMP), a negative truth p depends on reality insofar as p ’s truth-value is entirely subject to changes in the world beyond p . That is, it would *only be in virtue of* very specific changes in the world that there would be a change in the truth-value of p . This means that *only* a change in the world can render a change in the truth-value of p , i.e., changes in what exists (but not, for instance, changes in the truth-values of other propositions) would be responsible for a change in p ’s truth-value. Because p ’s truth-value would change only *in virtue of* a change in the world, this indicates that p asymmetrically depends on the world for its truth-value. Of course, the world would change if p ’s truth-value were to change, but the world would not change in virtue of a change in p ’s truth-value. Because p ’s truth-value is liable to only with certain changes in the world, the world, as it were, holds fixed p ’s truth (though not because it contains some entity that necessitates p ’s truth). This dependence is a form of asymmetrical supervenience. The foregoing analysis suggests the following principle of truthmaking for contingent negative truths:

(TMN) For any entity x and contingent negative truth p , x is a truthmaker for p iff p is about x ²⁶ and it would only be in virtue of a change in x that p would be false, viz. a change such that at least one entity would exist, which actually does not, in virtue of which p is false.

necessitating truthmakers. See my (2015: section 5) for reasons why the arguments given for Necessitarianism are unpersuasive.

²⁶ TMN requires negative truths to be about their truthmakers. There is no question that it is difficult to say what any negative existential truth is about. However, if negative existentials are about *existing* entities at all, they seem to be about that portion of being of which they say that something does not exist. In other words, negative existentials are about their domains of quantification. <There are no Hobbits> says that there are no Hobbits in our most unrestricted domain of quantification, which is the world itself. Other negatives are about more restricted domains, e.g., <there are no Arctic penguins> is about the Arctic and <there is no beer in the refrigerator> is about the refrigerator. Consequently, not every negative truth is made true by the world as a whole. Again, see my (2015: section 4) for further discussion.

This principle captures the unique form of dependence that holds between negative truths and the portions of reality they are about. Applying TMN: <there are unicorns> is made true by the world as a whole because this proposition is about the world as a whole and it would only be in virtue of a specific change in the world as a whole (i.e., a unicorn coming into existence) that this proposition would be false rather than true; <there are no Arctic penguins> is made true by the Arctic because this proposition is about the Arctic and it would only be in virtue of a specific change in the Arctic (i.e., a penguin coming to exist in the Arctic) that this proposition would be false rather than true. I submit that the form of asymmetrical supervenience characterized by TMN realizes T_R and plays the truthmaking role by satisfying (a)-(f) for the domain of negative truths.

Our principle TMN allows us to provide negative truths with truthmakers. TMN does not require negative truths to have necessitating truthmakers that satisfy some relevance constraint (as OTT does). Hence, TMN does not require the postulation of absences, totality properties, the world's essential worldliness (Cameron 2008), or the world's being the one fundament on which all its parts are grounded (cf. Schaffer 2010a and 2010b).²⁷ Because it does not require negative truths to have necessitating truthmakers, TMN avoids the objections raised by Merricks (2007: 46-55) to similar views involving the world as a truthmaker for negatives. Admittedly, TMN commits us to the existence of domains that negative truths are about, including the widest domain, the world itself.²⁸ It also commits us

²⁷ See my (2012) for a critique of Armstrong's, Cameron's, and Schaffer's solutions to the problem of truthmakers for negatives.

²⁸ Is the form of truthmaking characterized by TMN off limits to the mereological nihilist? Not necessarily. TMN could be modified in a nihilist-friendly way. The nihilist will say that what <there is no beer in the refrigerator> is about is not the refrigerator, but simples-arranged-refrigerator-wise. It would only be in virtue of a change in the simples-arranged-refrigerator-wise that there would be a change in the truth-value of <there is no beer in the refrigerator>. TMN would, of course, have to be edited to involve plural quantification over entities that can be truthmakers, i.e., "For any entities $xx...$ " See Cameron (2008b) for discussion of the relation between truthmaker theory and nihilism. I thank an anonymous referee for prompting me to address this issue.

to the possibility that these domains can change simply by gaining additional entities.²⁹ These commitments are prima facie plausible and much less controversial than the candidate truthmakers listed above. If this conception of truthmaking is viable, then we've upheld Maximalism with respect to negative truths and diminished controversial ontological commitments. We have done this by employing a pluralistic approach to truthmaking, i.e., by considering the nature of a particular domain of propositions, and then identifying the form of dependence its truth's exhibit on reality as that which realizes the truthmaking relation T_R .

§4. Motivating PTT

We saw in §1 that OTT faces some formidable challenges. It requires us to identify for every negative truth, counterfactual truth, and analytic truth, etc. an entity whose existence guarantees the truth of these propositions. Since there are no obvious candidate truthmakers for these truths, defenders of OTT are forced to postulate controversial truthmaking entities, e.g., absences, totality facts, or irreducibly hypothetical properties. One way to diagnosis OTT's problem is by thinking of it as analogous to the so-called 'scope problem' facing traditional substantive theories of truth, such as the correspondence and coherence theories.³⁰ The problem is that according to these theories, the truth of a statement consists in *being F*, yet for some class of statements S, it is implausible to think that the truth of statements belonging to S consists in their *being F*. These theories may look plausible for certain truths, yet they lose their plausibility when generalized to truths in other domains of discourse. Similarly, OTT appears to face a scope problem of its own. According

²⁹ This possibility can be understood either temporally or modally. Temporally: it is possible that the world at time t_2 contains one or more entities than the world at t_1 (where t_1 is earlier than t_2). Modally: it is possible that there is a counterpart v of the actual world w that contains everything w contains and some more. Pawl (2013) discusses the interaction between principles like these and Truthmaker Necessitarianism.

³⁰ See Lynch (2001) and (2009: 4; 32-36) for formulations of the scope problem. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting that OTT faces an analogous scope problem.

to OTT, every truth is made true by an entity that necessitates its truth and which meets some relevance constraint, e.g., it must explain the truth or be what the truth is about. This conception of truthmaking seems correct for truths about what exists and what categorial properties/relations are instantiated. That positive existential truths have necessitating truthmakers that satisfy some relevance constraint is highly plausible. But when it comes to truths concerning what is not, what could be, what was, etc. the plausibility of OTT diminishes. It is by no means clear, for instance, that either a subjunctive conditional like <if Curley had been offered a \$35,000 bribe, he would have freely taken it> or a negative existential like <there are no Hobbits> is about some entity that necessitates its truth. OTT's scope problem is intimately tied to the problem of missing truthmakers: the reason the principles of truthmaking offered by defenders of OTT do not adequately generalize is that for many classes of propositions, there seem to be no entities that satisfy the conditions for being a truthmaker supplied by those principles.

The alethic pluralist thinks that the scope problem for traditional theories of truth should lead us to reject alethic monism and hold that the truth properties identified by traditional theories of truth are only applicable to certain domains of discourse. Analogously, the truthmaking pluralist thinks that OTT's scope problem should lead us, not to fully reject OTT's conception of truthmaking, but to restrict it to a particular domain of truths and allow truths of other domains to be made true in different ways. If OTT does face this scope problem, then Maximalists have a reason to endorse PTT. That is, in light of the scope problem, the Maximalist should be motivated to pursue PTT because it may give her the resources to uphold Maximalism while reducing the need to posit controversial truthmakers. Ultimately, it is the *methodology* of PTT that offers hope of providing every truth with a ground while reducing controversial ontological commitment. The pluralist approach to

truthmaking is an open-ended research program. Focusing on domain specific accounts of truthmaking offers the option of finding novelty and complexity at the level of truthmaking, rather than truthmakers. We should not claim too much on behalf of PTT in a programmatic essay like this. At this point, the most we could claim for PTT is that the pluralist approach is fruitful when applied to positive and negative truths. Adopting PTT does not guarantee that we will never have to postulate something new to ground a truth. But if we must, it will be due to the particular factors pertaining to the propositions under consideration, and not because we are committed to a particular conception of truthmaking prior to such inquiry.

At this point one might wonder why we should struggle to preserve Maximalism rather than to restrict TM and embrace Non-Maximalism. Absolving some truths from needing truthmakers does reduce ontological commitment, giving us a simpler ontology, e.g., no absences, irreducibly hypothetical properties, etc. are acknowledged. However, Non-Maximalists face their own challenges. Those attempting to restrict TM presumably have the original intuition motivating truthmaker theory, viz. that truth depends on being. But, as Merricks (2007: 41) notes, this intuition does not seem to exempt any particular class of truths; it is an intuition about truth in general. It is, moreover, difficult to give a principled reason why some truths but not others need truthmakers; our inability to identify or unwillingness to postulate requisite truthmakers for these truths is not such a reason. If one simply restricts TM without providing some alternative account or explanation for those truths without truthmakers, then one must regard such truths as ungrounded and unaccounted for, which would flout the plausible and compelling thought that truths need grounding or explaining. Since PTT seeks to preserve Maximalism, it faces no such difficulty.

Whether or not the Non-Maximalist can provide a principled restriction of TM, she might be thought to have an advantage over the truthmaking pluralist. Namely, that it is

preferable to keep truthmaking unified and restrict the scope of its application than to maintain Maximalism and introduce plurality into truthmaking. What the Non-Maximalist fails to appreciate is that her own view incurs a commitment to another form of pluralism, one of truth itself.³¹ Suppose that some truths, but not others, have truthmakers. If so, then *being true* is a relational property (one had because the bearer stands in a relation to another entity) of truths with truthmakers. For if a proposition p is made to have the property *being true* by some entity x , then p stands in a relation (that of truthmaking) to x . Moreover, p would not be true if it did not stand in that relation to x (or something relevantly similar to x , if p can have more than one truthmaker). At least part of the reason why p instantiates *being true* is that it stands in a relation to something else. Hence, *being true* is a relational property of p if p has a truthmaker.³² On the other hand, *being true* would be a non-relational property of truths without truthmakers. Such propositions would be true, but not in any way because of their relation to anything else. But *being true* cannot be both a relational and non-relational property on pain of contradiction. To avoid the contradiction, the Non-Maximalist should embrace a pluralism about truth and hold that truths with truthmakers instantiate a different truth property, a relational one, than truths without truthmakers, which instantiate a non-relational truth property. The Non-Maximalist keeps truthmaking unified but at the expense of making truth plural. So it is no longer obvious that the Non-Maximalist has an advantage over the truthmaking pluralist.

³¹ At least one Non-Maximalist, Noël Saenz (*manuscript*), has recognized this consequence of the view. Saenz also developed this argument independently of the version presented here. Barker and Jago (2012: 136) also point out that Non-Maximalism entails pluralism about truth.

³² This undercuts the objection that p could be made true by x , without it being the case that *being true* is a relational property of p , i.e., that *being true* may be monadic and non-relational property of p even if p has a truthmaker. The problem with this objection is that if *being true* is a non-relational property of p , then p need not stand in any relation to anything else (a fortiori, to x) in order to be true. But this is false given that x is p 's truthmaker.

Furthermore, the Non-Maximalist's form of truth pluralism incurs costs not accrued by truthmaking pluralism. First, truth pluralism is a more radical and revisionary kind of pluralism than truthmaking pluralism since truth is a more fundamental notion than truthmaking, which is partly defined in terms of truth. Second, the Non-Maximalist's commitment to truth pluralism burdens her with the so-called "problem of mixed inferences."³³ Third, the kind of truth pluralism the Non-Maximalist is committed to is non-standard: most alethic pluralists identify different *relational* properties, e.g., correspondence, coherence, ideal justification, etc. (cf. Lynch 2009) as the relevant truth properties in different domains. The Non-Maximalist is committed to a non-relational truth property, which makes it incongruent with well-known versions of alethic pluralism. The Non-Maximalist need not endorse these versions of alethic pluralism, but then it is incumbent upon her to formulate the new version of alethic pluralism. By seeking to maintain Maximalism, PTT need not commit itself to the kind of truth pluralism to which Non-Maximalists are committed. Indeed, PTT does not entail any version of alethic pluralism (though it may be compatible with some versions) nor is it incompatible with traditional, monistic theories of truth. The truthmaking pluralist can hold that truth is correspondence and think that truthmaking takes a variety of forms, so long as each truth corresponds to its truthmaker.

I've claimed that PTT has certain advantages over its main rivals—OTT and Non-Maximalism. PTT's rejection of truthmaking monism and embrace of truthmaking pluralism offers a strategy for solving the problem of missing truthmakers and the problem of suspicious truthmakers. In this way, PTT can be seen as a way of splitting the horns of Dodd's (2007) dilemma for the truthmaker theorist, namely, that she either provide

³³ Williamson (1994) and Tappolet (1997) spell out this problem, which is essentially the challenge of explaining how validity preserves truth in an argument with premises instantiating different truth properties.

necessitating truthmakers for the recalcitrant truths or justify a principled restriction of TM. If truthmaking is multiply realized by different dependence relations in different domains, as PTT says, there is no need to assume that every truth must have a necessitating truthmaker or that truths without necessitating truthmakers are not made true. If one is convinced of the truthmaker insight that truth depends on what exists, then PTT should be seen as a promising way of articulating that insight.³⁴ For PTT to be legitimated, we would have to identify other forms of dependence that function as the truthmaking relations for those other domains of truths. What we have done here is provide a framework and an example for how it might be done with other domains of truths. That is work for another time.³⁵

References

- Alston, W. *A Realist Conception of Truth*. Cornell University Press, 1996.
- Armstrong, D.M. *A Theory of Universals: Universals and Scientific Realism*. Vol. Vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, 1980.
- Armstrong, D.M. *A World of States of Affairs*. Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Armstrong, D.M. *Truth and Truthmakers*. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Asay, J. "Truthmaking, Truth, and Realism: New Work for a Theory of Truthmakers." (Dissertation) University of North Carolina, 2011.
- Asay, J. "A Truthmaking Account of Realism and Anti-Realism." *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 93 (2012): 373-94.
- Audi, P. "Grounding: Towards a Theory of the In-Virtue-Of Relation." *The Journal of Philosophy* vol. CIX, no. 12 (2012): 685-711.
- Barker, S., and Jago, M. "Being Positive About Negative Facts." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 78, no. 1 (2012): 117-38.
- Barnard, R., and T. Horgan. "The Synthetic Unity of Truth." In *Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates*, edited by C.D. Wright, and N.J.L.L. Pedersen, 180-96. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Beall, J.C. "Deflated Truth Pluralism." In *Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates*, edited by N.J.L.L. Pedersen, and C.D. Wright, 323-38. New York: Oxford University Press,

³⁴ The reason this conclusion is conditional is that I haven't argued that the best way to articulate the thought that truth depends on being is in terms of truthmakers. Dodd (2007) claims that the truthmaker insight is not well motivated, arguing that the dilemma mentioned above gives us reason to give up on truthmaking. I disagree, since PTT doesn't fall prey to his dilemma.

³⁵ I would like to thank Sven Bernecker, M. Oreste Fiocco, David W. Smith, Gila Sher, Cory Wright, Noël Saenz, Aaron Cotnoir, Adam Podlaskowski, Nikolaj Pedersen, Michael Lynch, Mark Bernier, Casey Hall, Daniel R. Siakel, Phillip Walsh, two anonymous reviewers, and audiences at the 2013 APA Eastern Division Meeting and the 2014 APA Pacific Division Meeting for their helpful comments and discussion on various drafts of this paper.

- 2013.
- Bennett, K. "Construction Area (No Hard Hat Required)." *Philosophical Studies* 154:2 (2011): 79-104.
- Bigelow, J. *The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist's Philosophy of Mathematics*. Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Bigelow, J. "Presentism and Properties." *Philosophical Perspectives* 30 (1996): 35-52.
- Briggs, R. "Truthmaking Without Necessitation." *Synthese* 189, no. 1 (2012): 11-28.
- Cameron, R. "Truthmaker Necessitarianism and Maximalism." *Logique et Analyse* 48 (2005): 43-56.
- Cameron, R. "How to be a Truthmaker Maximalist." *Noûs* 42, no. 3 (2008a): 410-21.
- Cameron, R. "Truthmakers and Ontological Commitment: Or How to Deal With Complex Objects and Mathematical Ontology Without Getting Into Trouble." *Philosophical Studies* 140, no. 1 (2008b): 1-18.
- Cox, D. "The Trouble With Truthmakers." *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 78 (1997): 45-62.
- Dodd, J. "Is Truth Supervenient on Being?" *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 102, no. 1 (2001): 69-86.
- Dodd, J. "Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles." *Synthese* 156, no. 2 (2007): 383-401.
- Edwards, D. "Truth, Winning, and Simple Determination Pluralism." In *Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates*, edited by N.J.L.L. Pedersen, and C.D. Wright, 113-22. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Fine, K. "The Question of Realism." *Philosophers' Imprint* 1, no. 1 (2001): 1-30.
- Fine, K. "A Guide to Ground." In *Metaphysical Grounding*, edited by F. Correia, and B. Schnieder, 37-80. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Fox, J.F. "Truthmaker." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 65, no. 2 (1987): 188-207.
- Goff, P. "Orthodox Truthmaker Theory Cannot be Defended By Cost/Benefit Analysis." *Analysis* 70, no. 1 (2010): 45-50.
- Griffith, A. "On Some Alleged Truthmakers for Negatives." *Thought: A Journal of Philosophy* 1, no. 4 (2012): 301-08.
- Griffith, A. "Truthmaking and Grounding." *Inquiry: an Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy* 57, no. 2 (2014): 196-215.
- Griffith, A. "How Negative Truths Are Made True." *Synthese* 192, no. 1 (2015): 317-35.
- Heil, J. "The Legacy of Linguisticism." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 84, no. 2 (2006): 233-244.
- Heil, J. "Truthmaking and Entailment." *Logique et Analyse* 169-170 (2000): 231-42.
- Hornsby, J. "Truth Without Truthmaking Entities." In *Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate*, edited by H. Beebe, and J. Dodd, 33-47. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005.
- Kölbel, M. "'True' as Ambiguous." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 77 (2008): 359-84.
- Koslicki, K. "Varieties of Ontological Dependence." In *Metaphysical Grounding*, edited by F. Correia, and B. Schnieder, 186-213. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Kukso, B. "The Reality of Absences." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 84, no. 1 (2006): 21-37.
- Lewis, D. "A World of Truthmakers?" In *Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology Vol. 2*, edited by D. Lewis, 215-20. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Lewis, D. "New Work for a Theory of Universals." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 61, no. 4 (1983): 343-77.
- Lewis, D. "Truthmaking and Difference-Making." *Noûs* 35, no. 4 (2001): 602-15.
- Lowe, E.J. "An Essentialist Approach to Truth-Making." In *Truth and Truth-Making*, edited by E.J. Lowe, and A. Rami, 201-16. McGill, 2009.

- Lynch, M.P. "A Functionalist Theory of Truth." In *The Nature of Truth*, edited by M.P. Lynch, 723-49. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2001.
- Lynch, M.P. *Truth as One and Many*. Reprint ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Martin, C.B. "How it is: Entities, Absences and Voids." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 74, no. 1 (1996): 57-65.
- Melia, J. "Truthmaking Without Truthmakers." In *Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate*, edited by H. Beebe, and J. Dodd, 67-84. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005.
- Merricks, T. *Truth and Ontology*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007.
- Mulligan, K. "Two Dogmas of Truthmaking." In *Metaphysics and Truthmakers*, edited by JM Monnoyer, 51-65. Ontos Verlag, 2007.
- Mulligan, K., Simons, P., and Smith, B. "Truth-Makers." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 44, no. 3 (1984): 287-321.
- Parsons, J. "There is No 'Truthmaker' Argument Against Nominalism." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 77 (1999): 325-34.
- Pawl, T. "Change, Difference, and Orthodox Truthmaker Theory." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 3 (2013): 1-12.
- Pedersen, N.J.L.L., "Stabilizing Alethic Pluralism." *Philosophical Quarterly* 60 (2010): 92-1-8.
- Pedersen, N.J.L.L., and C. D. Wright. "Introduction." In *Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates*, edited by N.J.L.L. Pedersen, and C.D. Wright, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013a.
- Pedersen, N.J.L.L., and C. D. Wright. "Pluralism about Truth as Alethic Disjunctivism." In *Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates*, edited by N.J.L.L. Pedersen, and C.D. Wright, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013b.
- Pendlebury, M. "Facts and Truth-Making." *Topoi* 29, no. 2 (2010): 137-45.
- Rami, A. "Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making." In *Truth and Truth-Making*, edited by E.J. Lowe, and A. Rami, 1-36. McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009.
- Rasmussen, J. "How Truth Relates to Reality." *American Philosophical Quarterly* 50, no. 2 (2013): 167-80.
- Read, S. "Truthmakers and the Disjunction Thesis." *Mind* 109, no. 433 (2000): 67-79.
- Restall, G. "Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 74 (1996): 331-40.
- Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. "Why Truthmakers." In *Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate*, edited by H. Beebe, and J. Dodd, 17-31. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005.
- Russell, B. *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*. Edited by David Pears. Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 1985.
- Saenz, N. "The World and Truth About What is Not." *The Philosophical Quarterly* 64, no. 254 (2014).
- Saenz, N. "Truthmaking: A Proposed Analysis." (Manuscript).
- Schaffer, J. "Truth and Fundamentality: On Merricks's Truth and Ontology." *Philosophical Books* 49, no. 4 (2008): 302-16.
- Schaffer, J. "Monism: The Priority of the Whole." *The Philosophical Review* 119, no. 1 (2010a): 31-76.
- Schaffer, J. "The Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker." *The Philosophical Quarterly* 60, no. 239 (2010b): 307-24.
- Sher, G. "On the Possibility of a Substantive Theory of Truth." *Synthese* 117, no. 1 (1999): 133-72.
- Sher, G. "Forms of Correspondence: The Intricate Route From Thought to Reality." In *Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates*, edited by C.D. Wright, and N.J.L.L., Pedersen, 157-

79. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Sider, T. *Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Simons, P. "Negatives, Numbers, and Necessity Some Worries About Armstrong's Version of Truthmaking." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 83, no. 2 (2005): 253-61.
- Smith, B. "Truthmaker Realism." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 77, no. 3 (1999): 274-91.
- Schnieder, B. "Truth-Making Without Truth-Makers." *Synthese* 152, no. 1 (2006): 21-46.
- Tallant, J. "Ontological Cheats Might Just Prosper." *Analysis* 69, no. 3 (2009a): 422-30.
- Tallant, J. "Presentism and Truth-Making." *Erkenntnis* 71, no. 3 (2009b): 407-16.
- Tappolet, C. "Mixed Inferences: A Problem for Pluralism About Truth Predicates." *Analysis* 57 (1997): 209-10.
- Williamson, T. "A Critical Study of 'Truth and Objectivity'." *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 30 (1994): 130-44.
- Wilson, J. "No Work for a Theory of Grounding." *Inquiry* 56, no. 5-6 (2014): 535-579.
- Wright, C. *Truth and Objectivity*. Harvard University Press, 1992.